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Dunbar: Taxation

TAXATION
I.

DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSIONER

State ex rel. Rose v. Fewell, 294 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 1982)
Killen v. Logan County Commission, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va.. 1982)
In State ex rel. Rose v. Fewell' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the duty and authority of the State Tax Commissioner to enforce compliance by county officials in the valuaton of property for tax
purposes.
In Fewell, the State Tax Commissioner had attempted, without success, to
have his new appraisals entered on the Putnam County land books. He then
sought a writ of mandamus against the Putnam County Assessor and Commissioners, requesting that they either turn over the county property books to him
for adjustment
to the new property values, or to adjust the property books
2
themselves.
In granting the writ, the court noted the importance of the Tax Commissioner's appraisals in light of Killen v. Logan County Commission3 decided on
the same day as Fewell. If the "actual and true" value of property is to be
taxed, the Tax Commissioner's appraisals take on increased importance. Under
Killen, the Tax Commissioner sets the appraised values for taxation. County
assessors have no discretionary powers of valuation and assessment and are left
with only ministerial duties.4 The Fewell court noted that the legislature empowered the Tax Commissioner to supervise tax assessors and county commis5
sioners in the assessment and valuation of property.
In addition to the writ of mandamus, another possible method of enforcement was noted by the court. The Tax Commissioner had issued a subpoena
for the property books," and he could have sought a writ of attachment enforc7
ing the subpoena in the Circuit Court of Putnam County.

In 1965, the court had denied a writ of mandamus to the State Tax Com1

2

294 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 435.

3 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982). In Killen, the court held that the long-recognized practice of
assessing property for taxes at between fifty and one hundred percent of its appraised value, as
authorized by W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (Supp. 1981) was unconstitutional. The practice violated
the constitutional requirement of "equal and uniform taxation." W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Under the court's model, the increased assessments could be offset by a reduction in tax rates
charged by the local governments. Killen, 295 S.E.2d at 707-08. However, public fear of higher
taxes produced an amendment to the West Virginia Constitution which limits the assessment of
property. Thus, the passage of the amendment by the West Virginia voters on November 2, 1982,
nullified the effect of the Killen decision as it relates to assessed property values.
Killen, 295 S.E.2d at 708.
5 Fewell, 294 S.E.2d at 437-38. In support of the legislative grant of power, the court cited W.
VA. CODE §§ 6-9-1 (1979), 11-1-2 (1974), 11-3-1 (Supp. 1982), 11-3-24 (Supp. 1982), and 18-9A11(g) (Supp. 1982).
8 The subpoena duces tecum was issued under W. VA. CODE § 6-9-7 (Supp. 1982).
Fewell, 294 S.E.2d at 438.
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missioner under circumstances similar to Fewell. That decision was overruled
in Pauley v. Kelly," where the court held that the Tax Commissioner had the
authority to enforce his duties. The Fewell court went a step further by allowing a writ of mandamus and noting an alternative form of enforcement.
II.

NOTICE TO DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS

Don S. Co. v. Roach, 285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981)
In Don S. Co. v. Roach,10 the court outlined what notice is necessary to a
delinquent taxpayer whose property is to be sold for nonpayment of taxes.
The taxpayers claimed that they were not adequately notified of their delinquent tax status and of the subsequent sale of their land for nonpayment of
taxes. At that time, West Virginia Code § 11A-3-2 required notice by publication in a local newspaper."
The court, in an opinion by Justice McGraw, determined that the taxpayers had not received actual notice, and the trial record showed no publication
of notice. Therefore, the court reasoned, the taxpayers were denied due process, and the tax deed was void.' 2 The court listed the taxpayer's illiteracy and
low educational level as mitigating factors which "must be considered in a case
such as this ....

The court did not explain how illiteracy fits into the scheme of due process; nor did the court give practical guidelines, such as the degree of illiteracy
required for special treatment.
As the court noted, notice requirements to delinquent taxpayers have
changed since the amendment of West Virginia Code § 11A-1-8,14 requiring
actual notice. The court also gave a helpful outline of what actual notice
should include. 5
5 State ex rel. Rease v. Battle, 149 W. Va. 761, 143 S.E.2d 328 (1965), overruled, 255 S.E.2d
859 (W. Va. 1979).
9 255 S.E.2d 859, 881-82 (W. Va. 1979).
10285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981).
" W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-2 (1974).
"Don S. Co., 285 S.E.2d at 495-96. The opinion did not state whether or not notice by publication was given.
13 Id. at 496.
14 W. VA. CODE § 1lA-1-8 (Supp. 1982).
"I The notice should show what taxes are due, and how payment might be made. Also, the
notice should include:
...a statement that the failure to pay real property taxes could result in sale of the real
property by the State, and that if the land is not redeemed by the payment of delinquent taxes within eighteen months of the sale, the landowner risks the loss of all claim
to title.
Don S. Co., 285 S.E.2d at 496.
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MUNICIPAL TAXEs

Ellison v. City of Parkersburg,284 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1981)
The court approved the City of Parkersburg's method of financing garbage
collection in Ellison v. City of Parkersburg.0 In Ellison, Parkersburg taxed
owners of real property to finance the city's garbage collection. The city reasoned that owners of real property either used that property or rented it to
others.
If the owners used their property, they were the proper parties to bill for
garbage services. The owners who rented their property had two options. The
city, with notice from the property owners, would bill the tenant, or the owner
17
could pay the tax and pass the cost to the tenant in the form of higher rent.
Hence, the ultimate user paid for the garbage collection.
In an opinion by Justice McHugh, the court agreed with this logic and
found the plan to be within the confines of a city's statutory authority.18
IV. BusINESS AND OCCUPATION TAX
Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty, 285 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1981)
In Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty1 9 the court ruled that local television cable companies must pay business and occupation taxes on local revenues, even though the companies' function could be considered interstate in
nature.
Capitol Cablevision argued that it should not be taxed for two reasons.
First, by receiving out-of-state television broadcasts and transmitting them
into homes, the company was involved in interstate commerce. Therefore, taxation of its gross revenues by West Virginia violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution.2 Next, Capitol Cablevision claimed
that its activities, including placing its own programming on a channel to cable
subscribers, constituted "broadcasting," which was exempt from business and
21
occupation taxes in West Virginia.

The court, in an opinion by Justice McGraw, found neither argument persuasive. The mere fact that a business was involved in interstate commerce did
not preclude state taxation. Since Capitol Cablevision's revenues came from
purely local sources (cable subscribers in the Charleston area), the revenues
were taxable by West Virginia.2 2 However, only the in-state portion of revenues
23
were taxable.

284 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 906.
See W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 (1976).
Is 285 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1981).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 W. VA. CODE § 11-13-3(g) (1978).
22 The court cited Fisher's Blend Station, Inc., v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) as support for
its position.
23 285 S.E.2d at 416 (citing Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)).
Is

17
Is
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The court also found that Capitol Cablevision was not within the "broadcasting" exemption to business and occupation taxes.2 Television cable companies, to the court, were more like common carriers than broadcasters. Even
though Capitol Cablevision sent its own programming to subscribers, its activities essentially
amounted to a "delivery service" of signals to local
2 5
subscribers.

Since cable television companies are unique in nature, this decision will
have limited applicability to other business and occupation tax cases. However,
the principle of taxing local revenues of businesses engaged in interstate commerce appears well settled and is applicable to a wide variety of business
2
settings.

1

Charles D. Dunbar

2"

W.

2 285

11-13-3(g) (Supp. 1982).
S.E.2d at 420.

VA. CODE §

26 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), cited in Capitol Cablevision, 285 S.E.2d at 417-18.
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